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Gideon v. Wainwright and Related Matters
An Armchair Discussion Between Professor Yale Kamisart and
Vice President Walter Mondalett
Professor Kamisar: As many in the audience are well
aware, Vice President Walter Mondale played a major role in
getting twenty-two state attorneys general to sign an amicus brief
urging the U.S. Supreme Court to overrule the old Betts v. Brady'
doctrine (which only provided counsel in non-capital cases when
there were "special circumstances," such as an illiterate or
retarded defendant). The Court did overrule Betts and, in the
famous case of Gideon v. Wainwright, promulgated a new rule
which, when its outer limits were finally established, provided free
counsel for indigent defendants who were sentenced to one or more
days of jail time.
As I understand it, Mr. Vice President, in order to get as
many state attorneys general as possible to join the amicus brief
on behalf of Mr. Gideon, you established some conditions or
limitations on the new rule you were hoping the Court would
adopt:
(1) The new rule would not apply retroactively. (Florida
alone had thousands of people in prison who had not been
provided counsel.)
(2) The new rule would only apply to felonies, not
misdemeanors. Once the principle was established, the "outer
limits" of the new rule could be worked out later.
(3) The right to counsel would only apply to the courtroom-
the criminal trial itself-not, for example, to the police
interrogation room.
t. Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor Emeritus of Law,
University of Michigan; Professor of Law Emeritus, University of San Diego.
tt. Senior Counsel, Dorsey & Whitney LLP; Former U.S. Ambassador to
Japan; Forty-Second Vice President of the United States; Former Senator (D-MN);
Former Minnesota Attorney General.
1. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972). This became the rule regardless of whether an indigent defendant was
convicted of a petty offense or a misdemeanor; everything turned on whether a
defendant was sentenced to jail time.
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Vice President Mondale: I agree. Sooner or later, the
Supreme Court would decide how early the right to counsel began,
but there was no need to do so in the Gideon case. (Ultimately, the
Supreme Court would have a good deal to say about when the
privilege against self-incrimination first applied and when the
right to counsel began three years later-in a case called Miranda
v. Arizona.') I also spent time with our law enforcement leaders to
urge their compliance with the Miranda case. I believe they did
comply.
Professor Kamisar: As it turned out, the Supreme Court
adopted none of the three limitations sought by the state
attorneys-general.
When I recently looked at the states which then-Minnesota
Attorney General Mondale had in mind when other state
attorneys-general were approached and asked to join the amicus
brief, I couldn't help noticing that both California and New York
were missing. Were the attorneys general of those states unhappy
with the Supreme Court for some reason?
Vice President Mondale: As I prepared my remarks for our
law school seminar, I reviewed the list of state attorneys general
who supported our brief. I was astonished to see that California
and New York had abstained. For the life of me, I cannot explain
it. I am sure I had talked with them. Both were progressive
attorneys-general. Stanley Mosk of California and I were very
good friends.
Professor Kamisar: Let me explain how I got involved with
the Gideon case and how I got to know then-Minnesota Attorney
General Walter Mondale. In the early 1960s, some Minnesota
Law School professors had lunch with various law enforcement
lawyers, such as the state attorney general and the Minneapolis
and St. Paul prosecuting attorneys, once every three or four weeks.
My colleague Jim Hetland urged me to attend these meetings, and
I'm glad he did. That is how I came to know Mondale, who had
become Minnesota's Attorney General only four years after he
graduated from Minnesota Law School.
In 1962, I was putting the finishing touches on an article
strongly criticizing the old Betts rule' when the Supreme Court
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. See Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
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announced that it was going to reconsider the whole subject of
providing indigent defendants with free counsel.
The article I was working on had an important empirical
component to it. At the time, thirteen states did not have laws or
rules requiring the appointment of counsel in all felony cases
without regard to "special circumstances."6  I found it hard to
believe that so many states did not have a flat rule requiring the
appointment of counsel in all felony cases. So I decided to find out
whether that approach was true in practice by writing to
prosecuting attorneys and/or members of the states' attorney
general offices in these thirteen states. (It turned out that I had
guessed right.)
Some of the people I was corresponding with soon told me
that the Attorney General of Florida (where the Gideon case arose)
was urging them to join an amicus brief defending Florida's
position-to keep things just the way they were. The next time I
saw Attorney General Mondale, I asked him whether he had
received a letter from the Florida Attorney General urging him to
side with Florida in the Gideon case. As I recall, the Vice
President told me that he had thrown the Florida letter into the
wastebasket. Evidently he subsequently found it there. For, as I
had suggested, he wound up writing back to the Florida Attorney
General that (a) he couldn't believe anybody would defend the
current situation in states like Florida, and (b) if anything, he was
inclined to write an amicus brief against Florida.
Vice President Mondale: That's how I remember it, except
that I thought I had asked you to help me with the letter to the
Florida Attorney General, which you did.
Professor Kamisar: My correspondence with lawyers from
the thirteen states whose rules did not require the appointment of
counsel in all felony cases led me to conclude that in most of these
states, the actual practice was to provide counsel to all indigent
Dialogue on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962).
6. See id. at 17-20.
7. Mondale's letter to the Florida Attorney General was reprinted in part in a
Washington Post editorial praising Mondale for the position he took with respect to
the right to counsel. See Editorial, Fair Trials for Indigents, WASH. POST, Aug. 26,
1962, at E6. This editorial may have led Massachusetts Attorney General Edward
J. McCormack, Jr., to write an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Gideon-without
realizing that Mondale had decided to do the same thing. See Brief for the State
Government Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Cochran (Gideon v. Wainwright), 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (No. 155), 1962 WL 75209.
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felony defendants, at least when they so requested. The
exceptions were five southern states: Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina.!
Vice President Mondale: This is my understanding at the
time of Gideon. I always thought that the states in which official
racial discrimination was or had been practiced were also the
states most likely to have weakened procedural protections for
criminal defendants.
Professor Kamisar: We are celebrating the fiftieth
anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright by reminding people that
Vice President Mondale played an important role in getting
twenty-two state attorneys general to sign an amicus brief on
behalf of Clarence Earl Gideon. But we should remember that the
Gideon case was not the first time that Mondale warmed the
hearts of civil libertarians.
When the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio9 in 1961, the
case that held that all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is inadmissible in a state
court as well, there was a good deal of grumbling about the
decision in Minnesota police ranks. The reason was that
Minnesota (along with about half the states) had been admitting
illegally seized evidence all along.'o
When the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension conducted
a series of police institutes in 1962 to teach law enforcement
officers the law of arrest and search and seizure, there were many
complaints about the Mapp case. The instructors seemed more
interested in telling the police how to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment than in teaching the police how to comply with the
Amendment's requirements. This reaction disturbed the new
Minnesota Attorney General, Walter F. Mondale. He decided to
make the principal address at the next state police institute and
when he did he engaged in some straight talk.n'
At the next police institute, Mondale pointed out that the
language of the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment is identical
to the search and seizure clause of the Minnesota State
8. See Kamisar, supra note 5, at 19. See also Kamisar, supra note 5, at
Appendix I, pp. 67, 68, 70, 71, 73-74.
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Constitution. Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court had not
really imposed a greater restriction on the Minnesota police than
the one that already existed.
Mondale emphasized that what was a legal arrest before still
was. In short, as Mondale observed, "the Mapp case does not
reduce lawful police powers one iota. It only reduces potential
abuses of power."1 2
Mondale was quite unhappy about efforts to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment and Minnesota's counterpart to it. He
maintained that it was "contrary to our oath and destructive of a
free society." He continued: "[als Attorney General of this state, I
do not propose to permit our Constitution to be circumvented and I
serve notice upon anyone so inclined."1 3
Vice President Mondale: I do remember the conference at
which I urged law enforcement compliance with the Mapp case.
There was strong editorial support for my remarks, and I believe
the law enforcement leadership in our state supported my position
as well.
Professor Kamisar: I couldn't resist commenting on
Mondale's response to the Minnesota police's reaction to Mapp, but
let's get back to the right to counsel.
The six Justices of the Supreme Court who affirmed Mr.
Betts' conviction back in 1942 thought his case was an easy one, a
simple one. At one point Justice Roberts observed for the
majority:
The defense was an alibi.... The simple issue was the
veracity of the testimony for the State and that for the
defendant.... [Tihe accused was not helpless, but was a man
forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence and ability to
take care of his own interests on the trial of that narrow
issue. 14
So far as we can tell, none of the six Justices ever looked at
the trial record. Moreover, so far as we can tell, neither did any of
the three dissenting Justices (Justice Black, joined by Justices
Douglas and Murphy).
How many people were in the lineup when Mr. Betts was
identified as the robber? One-Mr. Betts."
12. See id. at 63.
13. Id.
14. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472 (1942).
15. See Kanisar, supra note 5, at 43-48.
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Did the victim of the robbery have any trouble identifying
Mr. Betts as the robber-even though Betts was the only person in
the lineup? The answer is yes. At one point, the victim admitted
that he might not have been able to identify Mr. Betts if he had
not been wearing the same dark gray overcoat with the bagged
pockets and the same dark amber glasses and the same
handkerchief around his chin that the robber was wearing on the
evening of the crime.
At one point, the robbery victim sounded as if he were
identifying the dark gray coat, not Mr. Betts. In response to a
question by the trial judge, the robbery victim said he identified
the coat the defendant was wearing at the one-person lineup
because it was dark gray and "bagged at the pockets"-just like
the coat the robber was wearing on the night of the robbery. 7
Whose coat was Mr. Betts wearing? Whose dark amber
glasses?
No gray overcoat or dark glasses were ever offered in
evidence. As best as I can tell, the victim described to the police
the various items the robber was supposed to have worn the night
of the robbery; the police simply went out and borrowed the items
from someone else and slapped them on Mr. Betts. The robbery
victim then made his identification, based largely on the items the
police had put on Mr. Betts.'8
A final word about the Betts case: at one point the Betts
majority made a comment about the case that must rank as one of
the ten silliest comments the Supreme Court has ever made. The
Court said that the defendant "had once before been in a criminal
court, pleaded guilty to larceny[,] and served a sentence and was
not wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure." 9
Unfortunately, in my lifetime I have been in a dentist's office
at least 100 times. So someone might say I am not "wholly
unfamiliar" with dentistry. I assure you, however, that I still don't
know how to fill a cavity, to say nothing about doing a root canal
procedure.
Looking back at Gideon fifty years later, how has it worked
out? There is widespread agreement that the typical lawyer
representing an indigent defendant is badly overworked-indeed,
often overwhelmed. These lawyers simply do not have anything
16. Id. at 48-49.
17. Id. at 48.
18. Id. at 49.
19. Betts, 316 U.S. at 472.
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close to the time they need to represent their clients effectively.2 0
Strickland v. Washington,21 the Court's principal case defining the
constitutional test for "ineffective assistance of counsel," has not
helped much.
According to Strickland, in order to establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendants must not only show
that their lawyer's performance was deficient (that they fell below
"an objective standard of reasonableness"),22 they must also show
that they suffered prejudice from the deficient performance.22 This
two-prong test has proved quite formidable. It does not help the
defendant that a court may reject an ineffective assistance claim
24on the basis of either prong, without considering the other one.
Vice President Mondale: Importantly, the Gideon case
established a clear constitutional standard-to provide for the
legal defense of indigent felony defendants in state criminal
proceedings. I remember the head of the Minnesota Public
Defenders Association telling an audience that Gideon has had a
very positive impact on criminal justice in Minnesota and I believe
the same could be said across the nation.
Nevertheless, many state practices and inadequacies clearly
diminish and damage the Gideon right-to-counsel principle, such
as: lack of adequate funds to support public defenders, low-fee
caps and low-bid/flat-fee contracts, lack of independence, crushing
case loads, excessive use by prosecutors of surprisingly high
minimum sentences, and "stacking up" proposed charges in order
to pressure the defendant to accept a guilty plea. As a practical
matter, there is a very severe penalty for those who insist on their
right to a criminal trial.
This so-called "trial penalty" may help explain the high
percentage of defendants who plead guilty rather than go to trial.
It is an astonishing ninety-four or ninety-five percent.25
20. For an in-depth discussion on the lack of time and resources facing public
defenders, see generally, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S
CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrativelegal-aid-indigent de
fendants/is sclaid def bp-right to counsel in criminal-proceedings.authcheckda
m.pdf, and KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR
PEOPLE'S JUSTICE (2013).
21. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
22. Id. at 669.
23. See id. at 687.
24. See id. at 700.
25. Recently, the Supreme Court reminded us that our system "is for the most
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The ABA has issued a much-studied list of principles of a
public defense system that should be our guide to achieving equal
justice. 26  The federal and state courts, states and counties,
lawyers and their associations should renew efforts to establish
equal justice-not only because it is a constitutional obligation but
also because the integrity and trust essential to our system of
justice depends upon it.
Professor Kamisar: There is a great deal to what you say.
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials," pointing out that ninety-seven
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012)). Shortly after the Mondale-Kamisar
lunchtime discussion took place, the New York Times reported that federal judges,
as well as many defense lawyers, were strongly criticizing federal prosecutors who
pressure criminal defendants to plead guilty by recommending much heavier
sentences for those found guilty after a trial, as opposed to those who plead guilty.
According to many critics, "federal prosecutors are strong-arming defendants into
pleading guilty and overpunishing those who do not-undermining the fairness and
credibility of the justice system." Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Draw Fire for
Sentences Called Harsh, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2013, at A19.
26. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1
(2002), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrativellegal-aid-indigent-
defendants/is_sclaid-def.tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf. The statement of
principles points out, inter alia, that "[clounsel's workload, including appointed and
other work, should never be so large as to interfere with the rendering of quality
representation or lead to the breach of ethical obligations, and counsel is obligated
to decline appointments above such levels." Id. at 2.
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